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IC 75-4501
25 November 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [   ]

SUBJECT: An Overview of NSCIC, the NSCIC Working Group, and
Other Consumer Contacts

1. NSCIC was formed in direct response to the November 1971
Presidential letter to the DCI, which stressed, among other points,
that "more effective review of intelligence product quality and
policy must be provided to the DCI, especially by high-level consumers
of substantive national intelligence." In that spirit NSCIC convened
its first meeting in December 1971 and formed a subordinate Working Group
to staff out these worthy objectives.

2. The NSCIC Working Group has met 15 times since then, and a
review of the minutes of these meetings shows that the Intelligence
Community has not shirked its duty, in terms of suggesting topics
of interest, staffing them out, and recommending ways of improvement.
Indeed the Community in the person of the DCI pointed out at the initial
NSCIC meeting that this was the first time the Intelligence Community
had ever had any formal means of receiving the views of its principal
consumers on the intelligence product. Moreover, the initiative came
from the Community to reorganize the Working Group to more nearly
reflect the views of the consumers--this in 1974--and also from the
D/DCI/IC to transfer the chairmanship of the Working Group from himself
to General Scowcroft of the NSC Staff--again better to reflect consumer
views.

3. The problem is that meanwhile the voice of the high level
consumers has faded away. At the first NSCIC meeting Dr. Kissinger
opined that this group of senior intelligence officials should meet
"at fairly lengthy intervals"; but he also went on to recommend that
NSCIC then meet within two weeks, so that the members could formulate
a proper list of needs, and thereafter every two months. As it
turned out, NSCIC has only met one other time, in October 1974 when
it approved the reconstitution of its Working Group. Repeatedly the
NSCIC Working Group--more specifically, the Intelligence Community
representation on it--has prepared relevant studies for NSCIC, only to
have these go to waste when NSCIC failed to convene. In effect, the
Working Group has become the highest collective voice of the consumers.

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4. As I see it, there are two options for dealing with this situation. One is to change nothing. That is a more attractive option than it might at first appear. So long as the high level consumers continue to remain passive in the process of product review, they really cannot blame the Intelligence Community for indifference to their needs. Moreover the NSCIC Working Group, in its reconstituted form, i.e., with a consumer as chairman and with subordinate committees. now has the capability to address specific, substantive topics to a degree probably not achievable at a higher level. Also, the Community's position in this body is about right, which is to say it has limits to it; the Community is not doing all the consumers' staff work.

5. But the Working Group is not as effective as it should be, and may wither on the vine unless it gets guidance periodically from a higher level. The second option, then, is to combine NSCIC with PFIAB. Their functions overlap now, and of the two groups PFIAB appears the more energetic. If the two were made one then the NSCIC Working Group could be expanded in size to reflect the composition of the new higher body.

6. All of the foregoing can be documented at (tedious) length from PRD's files on NSCIC and the Working Group, but this is probably enough by way of an "impressionistic" appraisal. [   ] has 25X1 contributed the next paragraph on matters generally outside the NSCIC--NSCIC Working Group framework.

7. In addition to our NSCIC Working Group account, PRD establishes contacts with consumers during the course of our post-mortem (and other) investigations. The preparation of the Middle East (October 73 War) Post Mortem and the Cyprus Post Mortem, for example, involved PRD interviews with a variety of consumers in DOD, the Department of State, and the NSC Staff. We have not sought direct interviews with top people but have, when appropriate, talked to those who were familiar with the views of very senior officials. We have also, of course, elicited comments from working and middle-level consumers.

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Distribution:
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      1 - AB Subject
      1 - WMH Chrono
DCI/IC/PRD/[   ]

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24 November 1975

Mr. Colby:

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Your expression of hope this morning that the "Knoche and ⬚ Group" try to foment some interest in substance reminded me of a conversation I had with ⬚ when the   25X1
Murphy Commission was getting off the ground. We concluded that after all is said and done, the acid test of intelligence is the extent that it contributes to the decision-making process. Hopefully our most significant function is to help others, e.g., the White House, State, Defense, etc., reach an educated policy decision.

There are bushel baskets full of studies on procedures, prerogatives, plumbing, jurisdiction and controls. There is little on the shelf re the role of intelligence in the decision-making process from the "decider's point of view." You have undoubtedly given a great deal of thought to this dilemma. If your concern with substance rather than plumbing can translate itself into some direction for the Knoche ⬚ Group, it   25X1
would be my guess that it might cause a healthy change in focus.

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B. C. Evans

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Remarks:

Attached provided for whatever it may be worth?

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Remarks:

    Attached is another paper that will be
reviewed at 1300 today.

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Executive Secretary
11/25/75
Date

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
19 November 1975

Meeting called by Mr. Ogilvie, OMB, for today at 3:00 in Room 175, Old Executive Office Building.

Attendees:

<u>CIA</u>
Hank Knoche

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<u>State</u>
Bill McAfee, INR
Tom Reckford, INR

<u>White House</u>
Ray Waldman
Tim Hardy

<u>NSC</u>
Bud McFarlane

<u>DOD</u>
RAdm Robert Hilton
David ("Doc") Cooke

<u>OMB</u>

Don Ogilvie
Dick Stubbing
Bill Mitchell

DCI/DDCI

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9	D/DCI/NIO		✓	19			
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Remarks:

I'd like separate
CIA + IC
representation —
Names? —

DCI/DDCI
1/13/75

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR   THE SECRETARY OF STATE
                             THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY
                             THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                             THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
                             THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
                                MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
                             THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Organization and Management of the
                     Foreign Intelligence Community

The President has directed that a study be made of the organization
and management of the foreign intelligence community. The study
should include an examination of:

    -- the basic structure of the community,
    -- key problems of organization and management,
    -- definition of requirements,
    -- systems design and selection
    -- resource allocation,
    -- guidance mechanisms,
    -- consumer-producer relationships, and
    -- relevant recommendations of the Rockefeller and Murphy
       Commissions.

Based upon the results of these reviews, the study should:

    -- evaluate the need for changes in the current organization of
       the foreign intelligence community,
    -- present options for a possible reorganization of the foreign
       intelligence community, and
    -- submit the recommendations of each addressee on the options
   presented.

This study will be prepared by an ad hoc group composed of representa-
tives of the addressees and chaired by the representative of the Office of
Management and Budget. The study should be completed by December 12,
1975. It will be submitted to the Intelligence Coordinating Group which
was established by the President on September 19, 1975.

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION GROUP

PROPOSED TASK PLAN

Study Plan: Review Foreign Intelligence Community
only; counterintelligence and domestic
intelligence agencies excluded

PHASE I - OBJECTIVES, NEEDS AND PROBLEM DEFINITION (Nov 20-24)

A.   Study Objective.   '

The primary objective is to identify organizational
alignments and management arrangements

-- to develop and deliver the best and most
timely substantive intelligence products
to policy-makers and government operators,

-- to insure that decisions to employ intel-
ligence activities are proper, well considered
and advised, and

-- to insure that such activities, when employed,
are well directed and monitored with assigned
accountability.

All of this is to fall within an environment of
effectiveness, efficiency and economy.

B.   Current and future trends -- look ahead 5-10 years.

o   Areas of greater/lesser emphasis.

-- Mission area - Soviet, PRC, Europe, Middle
East, Near East, Other.

-- Type intelligence - military, political,
econimic, national vs tactical.

-- Intelligence resource mix - collection,
processing, production.

-- Time sensitivity - e.g., six months; 1-2
weeks; less than one week.

C. The users of foreign intelligence (after Phase II).

o Who are they - President, agency heads, military commanders, agency staff.

o What are their needs - today and in the future?

o Have these needs been met in the past?

-- Performance evaluation.

o Conduct interviews with consumers/players.

D. Deficiencies identified in foreign intelligence.

o Executive Branch organization.

o Intelligence Community leadership.

o Intra-community relationships.

o Producer-user relations.

o Foreign intelligence (secrecy) in a democratic society.

o Executive/Congressional relations.

PHASE II - ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS (Nov 24-29)

1. Executive Office (and State) supervision, coordination and control.

2. Intelligence Community Leadership.

3. Control over Community Resources.

4. Producer/consumer relationships.

5. Need for secrecy and compartmentation.

6. Protection of sources and methods.

7. Covert action.

8. Intelligence support in crisis situations.

9. Control of intelligence resources in peace-time and war-time.

10. National intelligence support for field commanders.

11. Review the Intelligence Community organization.

12. Relationship of the Intelligence Community and Congress.

PHASE III - IDENTIFICATION AND REVIEW OPTIONS (Dec 1-5)

    o   Evaluate need for organizational changes.

    o   Identify most promising options.

    o   Spell out the pros and cons of each option.

PHASE IV - DEVELOP FINAL REPORT (Dec 5-15)

Dec 6 - Complete First Draft.

Dec 9 - Complete Second Draft.

Dec 10 - Review draft report with principals.

Dec 12 - Final Draft for comment/mark-up.

Dec 15 - Deliver final report.

Dec 16 - Receive formal agency comments.

1.   Executive Office and State supervision, coordination and control.

   1.   How Presidential needs are currently being served.

     -- Who reports to President on intelligence matters?

     --Responsibility for providing substantive intelligence unclear.

   2.   Executive Branch coordination in politically sensitive
     areas (e.g., covert action, clandestine collection)

   3.   Resource control unclear within the Executive Office.

   4.   Oversight procedures must be strengthened.

   5.   Role of PFIAB must be reexamined.

Sources: All Studies
        Hardy - PFIAB Data

2. Intelligence Community Leadership

1. Identify possible options

2. Evaluate capability of various options to resolve identified problem

3. <u>Control Over Community Resources</u>

    1. Describe and critique current resource control system
       - DoD/DCI/CIA/State/Treasury

    2. Resource control within the Executive Office

    3. Decision-making framework emphasizes functions (input)
       rather than mission product needs (output)

                                        processing,
    4. Inadequate review of balance between collection,/and production.

    5. Viability of existing committees including - IRAC, USIB, Excom

    6. Consumer role in resources

    7. National vs. tactical resources

    8. Performance evaluation--describe and critique

Sources:
    Schlesinger Study
    CIA Study
    OMB papers

1. Catalog of major relationships - DoD/DCI will provide quick survey by Tuesday

2. Trends in / quality, relevance, and timeliness of product shaped to user

3. Relative importance of structured vs. ad-hoc requirements

4. Intelligence personnel involvement in policy-making process

5. NSCIC effectiveness

6. Early warning capability needed.

7. Need for feedback; customer must iterate with producer

8. Greater need for lower level customer involvement

9. Washington relation with country teams.

10 Access to sensitive US info

Sources:
    Schlesinger
    CIA Study

5. <u>Need for secrecy and compartmentation</u>

    1. Describe and critique current system

    2. Must reexamine what needs to be protected

    3. Is customer being served properly - objective must be to deliver needed information to customer.

    4. Tendency under today's system to seal off on all sides

    5. Excess emphasis on clearances which consumers do not need; other potential customers are not being served since they do not possess clearances

    6. Overhead reconnaissance classification question - including possible delivery of product to outside users

    7. Parallel to classification study conducted in 1971

Sources:

25X1   paper
        Knoche papers
        Congressional proposal
        Hardy papers
        Space Policy Committee (overhead reconnaissance)

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6. <u>Protection of sources and methods</u>

    1. Describe existing authority (statutor) - partial in coverage (NSA and CIA included, DIA exclud

    2. Existing proposals for statutory ch es from DCI/DoD/White House are needed

    3. Review existing agency proposals and counterviews

    4. Protection vis-a-vis Congress/and public

Sources:

Hardy: Existing statues
       Statutory proposals

7. Covert action

1. Describe and critique existing nature and structure

2. Assess all levels of existing controls (including Congress)

3. Should it be part of the Intelligence Community?

4. Should it be in CIA?

5. Need for coordination on politically sensitive problems.

Sources:

25X1 ☐ - CIA Study Annex
Murphy Commission - Covert Action Annex
                         - Agency responses (in library)
    McAfee - will check

8. <u>Intelligence support in crisis situations</u>

   1. Describe and critique the current process including:

      . who provides intelligence to WSAG

      . Strategic Warning Staff (under DCI)

      . Early warning process

      . Alert memorandum

      . Operational Centers (White House Sit Room, NMCC, State, NSA)

      . Effectiveness of feedback mechanisms from policy-makers to intelligence producers.

Sources:

   CIA Study
   DIA Study of warning systems (library)
   DCI directive on strategic warning

9. Control of intelligence resources in peace-time and in war-time

    1. Describe and critique existing procedures (including statutory and formal ties between DoD/DCI)

    2. Can the military and DCI roles be more closely related?

10. National support for field commanders

    1. Outline will be provided by Tuesday (Action: Hilton, Knoche)

11. <u>Review of the Intelligence Community organization</u>

    1. Describe and critique the current structure

    2. Historical context shaping organizational decisions

    3. Identify its strengths and weaknesses

    4. Review the existing committee structure

    5. Identify abuses which have occurred

    6. Procedures for legal advice

    7. Restrictions + Limitations

12. <u>Relationship of the Intelligence Community and Congress</u>

    1. Describe existing arrangements

    2. Congressional oversight role and its implications

    3. Congressional access to intelligence product

    4. Role of the GAO

13. Restrictions + Limitations

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION GROUP

Work Schedule - November 24-30

Monday, Nov 24: 2 p.m.

   Review of the Intelligence Community organization   25X1

   Relationship of the Intelligence Community and
      Congress

Tuesday, Nov 25: 2 p.m.

   Execut. Office (and State) supervision,   HARDY
      coordination and control

   National support for field commanders   HILTON/KNOCHE

Wednesday, Nov 26: 2 p.m.

   Need for secrecy and compartmentation   HILTON/KNOCHE

   Intelligence support in crisis situations   HILTON/KNOCHE

   Control of intelligence resources in peace-time   25X1
      and war-time

   Covert action   25X1

Friday, Nov 28: 2 p.m.

   Control over Community Resources   MITCHELL

   Producer/consumer relationships   25X1

   Protection of sources and methods

Saturday, Nov 29/Sunday, Nov 30

   Wrap-up session(s) - complete work on all   ALL
      problem papers

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Executive Secretary

26 Aug

Date.

3637 (1-75)

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

August 25, 1975

Note to Ben Evans

Regarding John Hick's memorandum to
Carl Duckett on the "Use of Photointerpreter
and Supporting Resources" [   ] dated   25X1
25 July 1975) -- this subject is first on
the agenda of the Imagery Exploitation Review
Panel which will meet the first week in
September. I have attached a copy of the
memorandum to the review panel members and
the agenda. John Hicks will be the first
one to speak on this issue.

[   ]   25X1

INFORMATION